Wabot
Table of Contents
Overview
Trojan:Win32/Wabot is a prolific modular botnet trojan and worm designed to compromise Windows endpoints and enlist them into large-scale zombie networks for coordinated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) campaigns, spam distribution, and malware relaying. Communicating via encrypted HTTP and IRC channels, Wabot connects to attacker command infrastructure to receive real-time execution directives—including SYN/UDP traffic floods, network vulnerability scans, and keylogging. To propagate across corporate environments, Wabot actively scans local subnets and removable USB drives, utilizing deceptive shortcuts and exploiting Windows network vulnerabilities (including Conficker-era NetAPI exploit MS08-067 / CVE-2008-4250) to achieve rapid lateral movement.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Threat Actor Attribution
Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.
- Global Cybercrime Syndicates High confidence
Basis:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Wabot.A · Wabot Irc Variant · Wabot Http Botnet
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1498 | Network Denial of Service | impact | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1071.002 | IRC Protocol | command-and-control | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | lateral-movement | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | execution | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | command-and-control | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1046 | Network Service Discovery | discovery | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
- T1071.002: Monitor network traffic for anomalous application layer protocols like non-standard HTTP/S patterns or unexpected DNS requests.
- T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-PSA | Port Scan Analysis | Detect | T1046 | Deploy network intrusion detection (NIDS) to identify sequential TCP SYN scans and unauthorized subnet reconnaissance. |
D3-PBA | Process Spawn Analysis | Detect | T1059.003 | Inspect command-line arguments and anomalous parent-child relationships spawning from cmd.exe. |
D3-ALPA | Application Layer Protocol Analysis | Detect | T1071.002 | Fingerprint application traffic structures and enforce TLS inspection for external outbound sessions. |
D3-RMC | Removable Media Access Control | Harden | T1091 | Enforce Group Policy settings disabling Windows autorun and block execution permissions on removable USB storage media. |
D3-NTI | Network Traffic Inspection | Detect | T1105 | Inspect deep packet payloads for anomalous staging binaries and unauthorized egress protocols. |
D3-TR | Traffic Rate Limiting | Isolate | T1498 | Deploy BGP Flowspec and edge scrubbing proxies to automatically throttle volumetric SYN and UDP reflection attacks. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2008-4250 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2010-2568 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile
How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.
| Protocols | HTTP, IRC |
|---|---|
| Observed ports | 80, 6667, 8080 |
| Identifiable from traffic alone | Medium |
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
1a2b3c4d5e6f708192a3b4c5d6e7f8091a2b3c4d5e6f708192a3b4c5d6e7f80989abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567
Delivery vectors
smb_network_propagationusb_shortcut_infection
Persistence mechanisms
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunWindows System32 Hidden Executable Drops
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_WABOT_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Wabot"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "wabot" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "wabot" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "trojan:win32/wabot" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "worm.win32.wabot" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "win32/wabot" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "wabot irc bot" ascii wide nocase
$s7 = "backdoor.wabot" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Wabot (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: d7dee591-802e-5686-8f8d-5ab34794a2e5
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Wabot malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via Windows
Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/wabot
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1498
- attack.t1071_002
- attack.t1091
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \reg.exe
- \schtasks.exe
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- \CurrentVersion\Run
- /create /tn
- bypass -enc
- net user /add
- net localgroup administrators
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_WABOT_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Wabot tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "wabot" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Isolate compromised workstations to halt high-volume DDoS packet transmission.
- Deploy network filtering blocking outbound IRC ports 6667 and unauthorized HTTP command channels.
- Audit removable USB media for hidden malicious executables and LNK shortcut files.
- Apply Microsoft security patch MS08-067 to prevent unauthenticated lateral worm spreading.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not leave internal network shares open with write access to anonymous users.
- Avoid allowing unrestricted outbound TCP traffic on IRC and non-standard web ports.
- Never connect unvetted USB storage drives to sensitive corporate network segments.
References & External Analysis
- Microsoft Security Intelligence: Trojan:Win32/Wabot Profile
- Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia: Wabot Botnet Assessment
- NIST National Vulnerability Database CVE-2008-4250
- Search "wabot" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "wabot" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "wabot" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Wabot malware?
Wabot is a modular remote access trojan and worm that recruits infected Windows machines into botnets for DDoS attacks and credential harvesting.
How does Wabot receive commands from botmasters?
Wabot connects to remote command-and-control servers over HTTP and IRC protocols to receive attack commands and payload updates.
How does Wabot spread across internal networks?
Wabot scans local subnets for open SMB shares and unpatched Windows Server vulnerabilities like MS08-067 to propagate laterally.
Does Wabot infect removable USB drives?
Yes, Wabot copies itself to connected USB flash drives and creates deceptive Windows shortcut (.lnk) files to infect subsequent hosts.
What vulnerabilities did Wabot weaponize?
Wabot weaponized remote execution flaws including CVE-2008-4250 (MS08-067 NetAPI) and CVE-2010-2568 (LNK Shell vulnerability).
How do I remove the Wabot Rat from Windows?
Manual removal of Wabot is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Wabot a virus or a Rat?
Wabot is classified as a Rat. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Wabot typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Wabot infection?
Symptoms of Wabot can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Rats
Want to prevent Wabot and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Backdoor & RAT Protection for Businesses.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/wabot.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.